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PENNSYLVANIA DRUNK DRIVING LAW-RELATING BLOOD ALCOHOL
TEST RESULTS BACK TO THE TIME OF DRIVING-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that the plain language- of 75 Pa Cons
Stat Ann section 3731(a)(4) requires the state to establish the de-
fendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving. Therefore,
when the defendant's blood alcohol level minimally exceeds the
statutory limit (0.10%), the time between the defendant's driving
and his blood test is substantial, and the state has failed to relate
the test results back to the time of driving, the state has not met
its burden of proof and the defendant's guilt is left to speculation
which is not sufficient for conviction.
Commonwealth v Jarman, Pa , 601 A2d 1229 (1992).
At 9:11 p.m. on October 15, 1987, Luther Jarman ("defendant")
was operating his car when a Pennsylvania state trooper noticed
that one of the vehicle's headlights was burned out.' The trooper
followed the defendant for approximately one-half mile but did
not notice anything unusual in the manner of the vehicles opera-
tion.2 The trooper, nevertheless, decided to pull the defendant over
because of the burned out headlight.'
During the stop, the trooper noticed the odor of alcohol on the
defendant's breath and ordered him to perform a field sobriety
test.' Failing the sobriety test, the trooper placed him under ar-
rest.' The defendant was transported to a hospital where, approxi-
mately one hour after the stop, a blood test was performed which
revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.114%.6
The defendant was charged under two provisions of 75 Pa Cons
1. Commonwealth v Jarman, Pa , 601 A2d 1229 (1992).
2. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1229.
3. Id.
4. Id.
In determining reasonable grounds for DWI arrests, many police departments use
field sobriety tests in which a suspect is requested to step from his vehicle and engage
in a number of physical acts which are designed to test the person's coordination for
the purpose of determining intoxication. The finger-to-nose test, picking up coins,
walking a line, reciting the alphabet, and other similar activities have become a fairly
common part of DWI arrest procedure.
Black's Law Dictionary, 626 (West 6th ed 1990).
5. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1230.
6. Id.
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Stat Ann section 3731(a).1 The first charge was that the defendant
was driving while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which
rendered him incapable of safe driving.' The second alleged that
he had been driving a vehicle while the amount of alcohol by
weight in his blood was greater than 0.10%."
At trial in the Court of Common Pleas,10 a jury acquitted the
defendant of the first count.' The defendant was convicted, how-
ever, of the second charge of operating a vehicle while the amount
of alcohol by weight in the blood is greater than 0.10%.12 An ap-
peal was made to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, where the
judgment was affirmed.13 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted allowance for appeal.14
Justice Flaherty, writing for the court, centered his, opinion on
the sufficiency of the evidence in relating the blood alcohol test
results back to the time of driving.' 5 This became necessary be-
cause the section under which the defendant was convicted made it
an offense to "drive" a vehicle while one's blood alcohol level is
0.10% or greater.' 6 Therefore, applying the plain language of the
statute to establish a prima facie case, the Commonwealth must
prove a blood alcohol level at the time of driving .11
Examining this case in relation to the blood alcohol test results
7. Id.
8. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(1) (Purdon 1977). This statute provides: "(a) Of-
fense defined.-A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of any vehicle while: (1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders
the person incapable of-safe driving." 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(1).
9. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(4) (Purdon 1983). This statute provides: "(a) Of-
fense defined.-A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of any vehicle while: (4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the
person is 0.10% or greater." 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(4).
10. "In the court system in Pennsylvania, the Court of Common Pleas is the court
wherein all civil and criminal actions are begun (except such as are brought before courts of
inferior jurisdiction)." Black's Law Dictionary, 356 (West 6th ed 1990).
11. Commonwealth v Jarman, No. 2904 CA York County Criminal Division, (1987).
12. Jarman, No. 2904.
13. 398 Pa Super 645, 573 A2d 620 (1988).
14. Commonwealth v Jarman, Pa , 601 A2d 1229 (1992).
15. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1230. Commonwealth v Gonzalez, 519 Pa 116, 546 A2d 26,
30-35 (1988), discusses the difficulty of "relating back" blood alcohol test results to the time
of driving.
16. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(4). In contrast, the court noted that the legisla-
tures of certain other states enacted statutes making it an offense to drive with blood alco-
hol content of 0.10% "as shown by" or "as determined by" a blood alcohol test administered
within a specified time after driving had ceased. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1230. See generally
People v Mertz, 88 NY2d 136, 506 NYS2d 290, 497 NE2d 657 (1986).
17. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1230.
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and the time of driving, the court considered several factors.18 The
first was the time lapse of approximately one hour between the
defendant's driving and the administration of the blood test."9 Also,
in uncontradicted testimony, the defendant testified that he con-
sumed four or five "lite" beers during his two hour stop at the
bar." He further testified that after finishing his last beer, he im-
mediately left in his car, shortly after which he was arrested. The
timing of the blood test now became relevant because of the testi-
mony of the Commonwealth's expert witness.22 The expert testified
that a person's blood alcohol level fluctuates with the passage of
time and that alcohol levels gradually rise after the consumption of
alcohol until a peak is reached roughly sixty to ninety minutes af-
ter drinking has ceased.2 3 The Commonwealth's expert witness also
testified that the defendant's blood alcohol level one hour prior to
the test was probably less than 0.10%24
Other factors further weakened the inference of guilt. The Com-
monwealth's expert witness further testified that the blood testing
equipment had a margin of error of plus or minus 10%.25 In addi-
tion, considering all relevant factors, the expert witness could not
testify whether the defendant's blood alcohol level was in fact
greater than or equal to 0.10% at the time of driving.26
The supreme court considered the fluctuations in blood alcohol
levels, the margin of error in testing and the small amount by
which the test results exceeded the legal limit one hour after driv-
ing, and determined the jury had been free to engage in "unbri-
dled" speculation as to the defendant's blood alcohol level at the
time of driving.27 The court, therefore, reversed because a criminal
conviction cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture28 and
the court did not believe that the Commonwealth met its burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's blood al-
cohol exceeded the permissible limits while driving.2 9







25. Id. The defendant's blood alcohol level could have been as low as 0.104%. Id.
26. Id at 1231.
27. Id.
28. Id citing Commonwealth v Holzer, 480 Pa 93, 389 A2d 101, 104 (1978).
29. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1231.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Cappy observed that operating a
motor vehicle is a privilege, not a right."0 As such privilege, the
license to drive is dependant upon compliance with the conditions
prescribed by the state and subject to such regulations and control
as the state may see fit.31 Since "it is virtually universally accepted
that a person with a [blood alcohol level] of 0.10[%] should not be
driving,"32 the legislature has passed drunk driving laws in "an at-
tempt to halt, or at least to retard, the wanton and senseless
slaughter of and injury to innocent people upon our highways
caused by drunk drivers.""3 With these considerations in mind,
Cappy believed the state should not be required to present expert
testimony to relate the blood alcohol test back to the time of
driving. 4
The dissent continued by observing that circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to convict one of an offense, 5 being sufficient to prove
any element or all elements of a crime.31 When reviewing the suffi-
ciency of the evidence in a criminal conviction, the court considers
the "evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
along with all reasonable inferences arising therefrom."3 " Consider-
ing these principles, Justice Cappy determined that the Common-
wealth should be permitted to prove a violation of the statute with
a highly accurate blood test. 8
Although the expert witness testified that alcohol reaches its
peak in the bloodstream sixty to ninety minutes after consump-
tion, it was not possible to tell with one blood test whether the
defendant's blood alcohol level was rising or falling. 9 The only ba-
sis for this determination was the defendant's testimony.40 If any
defendant exercises his right to remain silent under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Commonwealth
30. Id at 1232 (Cappy dissenting) citing Commonwealth v Funk, 323 Pa 390 186 A
65, 67-8 (1936).
31. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1232.
32. Id citing Commonwealth v Mikulan, 504 Pa 244, 470 A2d 1339, 1341 (1983).
33. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1232 citing Mikulan, 470 A2d at 1341.
34. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1232.
35. Id citing Commonwealth v Littlejohn, 433 Pa 336, 250 A2d 811 (1969).
36. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1232 citing Commonwealth v Hardcastle, 519 Pa 236, 546
A2d 1101, 1107-08 (1988).
37. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1232 citing Commonwealth v Meadows, 471 Pa 201, 369 A2d
1266 (1977).





has an impossible task in proving its case.41 Once the Common-
wealth establishes a 0.10% blood alcohol level, the burden of proof
is met and now shifts to the defendant to prove, via expert testi-
mony, that he was actually operating a vehicle below a 0.10%
blood alcohol level.4 2 "A 'case-by-case' review of every conviction
under the statute on the grounds alleged in this case [would] lead
to a virtually unenforceable and unworkable law."4 In this case,
the jury was free to disbelieve the defendant's testimony that his
blood alcohol level was rising, and find sufficient evidence to con-
vict the defendant under the statute." In conclusion, Cappy sup-
ported the reasoning of the superior court in Commonwealth v
Speights45 in that it provided the most logical, fair and safe
results.
6
Pennsylvania passed its first drunk driving law in 190941 which
provided for imprisonment and/or fine upon conviction of operat-
ing a motor vehicle when intoxicated.48 In 1919, the statutory defi-
nition had evolved to preclude the operation of any vehicle "while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any narcotic or habit
producing drug. . .. ,"' These and subsequent laws, however,
failed to provide any standard for evidencing guilt.50 The courts
aided somewhat, in 1957, by giving judicial notice to "drunkome-
ter" tests in the prosecution of drunk drivers.51 The definition of
the offense, however, remained relatively unchanged with the ex-
41. Id.
42. Id at 1232-33.
43. Id at 1233.
44. Id.
45. 353 Pa Super 258, 509 A2d 1263 (1986). See notes 77-81 and accompanying text
for a complete discussion of this case.
46. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1233.
47. Act of April 27, 1909 Pa Laws 265, 268, section 9 (1909).
48. The act read in pertinent part:
No person when intoxicated shall operate a motor-vehicle, and any person guilty of so
doing shall be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100), nor more
than three hundred dollars ($300), or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both; and the license of any person guilty of a violation of this section may be sus-
pended for six months by the Highway Commissioner.
1909 Pa Laws 265, 268, section 9 (1909).
49. Act of June 30, 1919 Pa Laws 678, ch 23 (1919).
50. 'It was not until 1976 that the legislature provided a standard of guilt to assist
police officers in deciding whether a motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol. 75
Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(1) provides: "for a driver to be guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol, he must be incapable of safe driving." Id. By. contrast, the earlier laws
did not attempt to define the term driving while intoxicated.
51. Commonwealth v Mummert, 183 Pa Super 638, 133 A2d 301 (1957).
1993
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ception of minor variations and additions until 1976.52 In that year,
the Pennsylvania Legislature passed Act 81.5 1 In that law, the leg-.
islature clarified the offense of drunk driving by prohibiting the
driving of any vehicle while the operator is under the influence of
alcohol to the extent that he is incapable of safe driving.54 Under
Act 81, a blood alcohol content ("BAC") reading of 0.10% or
greater merely created the presumption that a defendant was driv-
ing under the influence. 55 The prosecution still had to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the accused lacked the ability to op-
erate a vehicle safely because of the amount of alcohol he had
ingested.5 6
This law was- amended in 1982, retaining the definition of the
driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") offense used in the
prior law,57 but adding a per se provision to include drivers who
operate their vehicles while having a BAC of 0.10% or greater. 8
With the addition of the per se provision to the Motor Vehicle
Code, the sole issue to be decided by jurors was whether the de-
fendant had a BAC of 0.10% or greater while driving. 9
Almost immediately, the new per se law was challenged in Com-
52. In 1923, the penalty was increased to a fine of $100 or $500 and/or up to three
years imprisonment. Act of June 14, 1923, 1923 Pa Laws 718, codified at Pa Laws §20. The
. fines fluctuated in subsequent years, but the maximum jail term remained the same. The
1959 law adopted a $100 to $500 fine range, as well as the same imprisonment scheme, but
added several new categories of vehicles: "It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a
motor vehicle, tractor, streetcar or trackless trolley omnibus, while under the influ-
ence .. " Act of April 29, 1959, 1959 Pa Laws 58, codified at Pa Laws § 1037.
53. Act of June 17, 1976 Pa Laws 162, codified at 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731 (Pur-
don 1977).
54. Section 3731(a) reads in pertinent part:
a person shall not drive any vehicle while: (1) under the influence of alcohol to a
degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving, (2) under the influence of
any controlled substance ... , to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe
driving; or (3) under the combined influence of alcohol and a controlled substance.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a) (Purdon 1977).
55. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(d)(3) (Purdon 1977). In addition, if the BAC test
results showed 0.05% or less a presumption existed that the person tested was not driving
under the influence of alcohol. If the test indicated a BAC in excess of 0.05%, but less than
0.10%, that fact did not create a presumption, but could be considered with "other compe-
tent evidence." 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(d)(1)-(2) (Purdon 1977).
56. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(1) (Purdon 1977).
57. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(1) (Purdon 1977).
58. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(4) (Purdon 1983).
59. Section 3731(a)(4) makes it a per se crime to be driving with a BAC of 0.10% or
greater, and this is the only fact a prosecutor must prove to obtain a conviction under the
statute. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a)(4) (Purdon 1983).
Recent Decisions
monwealth v Mikulan.60 In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court discussed the flexibility of the Commonwealth's police pow-
ers6' and recognized that "it is now virtually universally accepted
that a person with a [BAC] of 0.10[%] should not be driving".
62
The court then concluded that the per se Motor Vehicle Code vio-
lations contained in section 3731(a)(4) were rationally and reasona-
bly related to the achievement of a legitimate goal, 3 namely, to
"halt, or at least retard, the wanton and senseless slaughter of and
injury to innocent people upon our highways caused by drunk
drivers.""'
This established, the court addressed the specifics of the consti-
tutional challenge, namely that due process was violated because of
the alleged vagueness of the statute. 5 Quoting Commonwealth v
Heinbaugh,66 the court reiterated that a penal statute "must give
reasonable notice of the conduct which it proscribes to a person
charged with violating its interdiction." 7 The court ruled that sec-
tion 3731(a)(4) does give adequate warning, 8 and that by "impos-
ing criminal liability for driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10%
or greater, the legislature did not exceed the latitude afforded [the]
Commonwealth under its police powers, nor did it violate any prin-
ciples of due process.''69 The court concluded by setting forth the
two elements centered in section 3731(a)(4): (1) the operation of a
motor vehicle; and (2) the presence of at least 0.10% alcohol by
weight in the motorist's blood "during the course of operation".7 °
Once established as constitutional, section 3731(a)(4) faced chal-
lenges in its application. In Commonwealth v Mattis,7 1 the defend-
ant's blood alcohol level was tested two hours and forty-five min-
utes after his arrest.72 Although the defendant's BAC was in excess
of 0.10% (it was 0.11%), the defendant was found not guilty, par-
60. 504 Pa 244, 470 A2d 1339 (1983).
61. Mikulan, 470 A2d at 1340.
62. Mikulan, 470 A2d at 1341 citing: Burg v People, 144 Cal App 3d 169, 192 Cal
Rptr 531, 534 (1st Dist 1983); State v Franco, 96 Wash 2d 816, 639 P2d 1320, 1323 (1982);
Roberts v State, 329 So2d 296 (Fla 1976); and Greaves v State, 528 P2d 805 (Utah 1974).
63. Mikulan, 470 A2d at 1342.
64. Id at 1341.
65. Id at 1343.
66. 467 Pa 1, 354 A2d 244 (1976).
67. Heinbaugh, 354 A2d at 246.
68. Mikulan, 470 A2d at 1344 quoting Heinbaugh, 354 A2d at 244.
69. Mikulan, 470 A2d at 1339.
70. Id at 1345.
71. 36 Pa D & C 3d 532 (1985).
72. Mattis, 36 Pa D & C3d at 532.
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tially because there was no expert testimony of BAC at the time of
driving.
73
Subsequent cases have held in the alternative. Courts have ruled
that a forty-seven-minute lapse between driving and blood testing
was irrelevant.7 4 More specifically, courts have ruled that medical
or expert testimony was not required to relate BAC test results
back to the time of driving.
A detailed analysis of the problem of relating blood alcohol test
results back to the time of driving was done in Commonwealth v
Speights.76 In Speights, the defendant, two hours and forty-five
minutes after his arrest, was given a "breathalizer" test which reg-
istered a BAC of 0.12%.11 Affirming the defendant's conviction, the
superior court held that "blood alcohol test results can-by them-
selves, without explanation by expert testimony-suffice to sup-
port a conviction under subsection 3731(a)(4) but that blood alco-
hol test results do not compel the trier of fact to find a defendant
guilty of violating subsection 3731(a)(4) where there is competent
evidence of record challenging [the] test results."78 The court rea-
soned that because "the remoteness of a blood alcohol test gener-
ally inures to the benefit of the defendant-driver, the Pennsylvania
legislature has not placed time restrictions on the use of blood al-
cohol test results but has provided methods whereby the reliability
of such results can be challenged. ' 79 "If a defendant wishes to con-
test the reliability of the blood alcohol test results offered by the
Commonwealth, he is statutorily permitted to do so, with the
weight to be accorded the test results properly resting with the
finder of fact."80
This reasoning prevailed into 1988 in cases such as Common-
73. Id. Section 3731(a)(4) makes 0.10% BAC a per se violation if the person is "driv-
ing" with a BAC of 0.10% or greater. See also Mikulan, 470 A2d at 1342.
74. Commonwealth v Gamber, 352 Pa Super 36, 506 A2d 1324, 1325 (1986).
75. Commonwealth v Slingerland, 358 Pa Super 531, 518 A2d 266, 268 (1986).
76. 353 Pa Super 258, 509 A2d 1263 (1986).
77. Speights, 509 A2d at 1264-65.
78. Id at 1267.
79. Id.
80. The court was referred to 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(f),(h).
Section 1547(f) specifically states that the other subsections of the Code's chemical testing
provision "shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evi-
dence bearing upon the question whether or not the defendant was under the influence of
alcohol." 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1547(f) (Purdon 1977).
Section 1547(h) allows a defendant to introduce into evidence the results of an additional
blood alcohol test performed by a physician of the defendant's own choosing. 75 Pa Cons
Stat Ann § 1547(h) (Purdon 1977).
Vol. 31:415
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wealth v Boyd.8 1 In Boyd, the superior court explicitly held that
the Commonwealth was not required to present expert testimony
relating blood alcohol test results back to the time the defendant
was driving, his car to support a conviction for operating a vehicle
while his BAC was 0.10% or greater.2 ,
Later that year, a more critical analysis of the relation between
blood alcohol test results and section 3731(a)(4) was done in Com-
monwealth v Gonzalez.8 3 At trial, the court recognized that it
takes from 30 to 90 minutes for alcohol to be fully absorbed and to
reach its peak level. 4 Based on this, the Commonwealth's expert
was unable to give an opinion as to the defendant's "related back"
BAC without knowing when the defendant had taken his last
drink. 5 The defendant's conviction was reversed because the evi-
dence did not reveal when the defendant had his last drink or
whether his blood alcohol had peaked prior to the arrest, and
therefore there was no way of judging whether his BAC was rising
or declining at the time of the arrest."'
Recognizing the correlation between the elements of section
3731(a)(4) of operating a vehicle with a BAC in excess of 0.10%
and the variables involved in blood testing, the courts have devel-
oped different approaches. In Commonwealth v Sharpe,8 7 the
court ruled that a delay between the operation of a motor vehicle
and the drawing of the motorist's blood goes only to weight, not
admissibility of the blood test and that the absence of expert testi-
mony relating results of the motorist's blood alcohol test back to
the time the motorist was operating his vehicle did not render the
test results inadmissable as to the charge of driving under the in-
fluence.8 More true to the problems realized in "relating back"
blood alcohol test results were approaches like the one used in
Commonwealth v Smith. 9 In Smith, four blood tests were admin-
istered in a two-hour period which established that the driver's
BAC was falling and therefore his first blood test was valid under
section 3731(a)(4).9 ° Another approach was used in Commonwealth
81. 373 Pa Super 298, 541 A2d 21 (1988).
82. Boyd, 541 A2d at 22.
83. 519 Pa 116, 546 A2d 26 (1988).
84. Gonzalez, 546 A2d at 33.
85. Id at 33-34.
86. Id at 34-35.
87. 388 Pa Super 301, 565 A2d 496 (1989).
88. Sharpe, 565 A2d at 497.
89. 382 Pa Super 288, 555 A2d 185 (1989).
90. Smith, 555 A2d at 192.
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v Britcher.9 1 The Britcher court gave all possible doubts in the dif-
ferent variables of blood testing to the defendant, and in doing so,
the BAC was still at 0.14%, therefore the defendant was con-
victed.2 This type of reasoning also prevails when the motorist's
BAC is excessive. In Commonwealth v Zelinski,93 the motorist's
BAC was 0.25% one hour after driving and the superior court
ruled that the conviction was valid although no expert testified
that the defendant's BAC was 0.10% or greater at the time of the
arrest.9 4 To the time of the Jarman case, though, there had been
no definite ruling on specifically what is. required to convict under
section 3731(a)(4).
It appears that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania realized that
the courts were uncertain in their application of section 3731(a)(4).
On the same day that Jarman was decided, Commonwealth v
Modaffare9 was also handed down addressing the identical issue
of relating blood alcohol test results back to the time of driving. In
Modaffare, the BAC marginally exceeded 0.10% (0.108%) in a
blood test administered a substantial amount of time after the ar-
rest was made (one hour and fifty-five minutes later).9 As in the
present case, Modaffare gave judicial notice to the fact that BAC
fluctuates with time, and as such, the conviction could not be sus-
tained because the BAC of the defendant barely exceeded the
0.10% standard in a test that the Commonwealth could not relate
back to the time of driving. 7
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania appears, on the surface, to
have now given a definite answer to the application of section
3731(a)(4). In both Jarman and Modaffare, the court applied the
plain language of the law in explicitly referring to the section
3731(a)(4) requirement of driving with a BAC of 0.10% or greater.
The court reasoned, therefore, that the blood alcohol tests must be
related back to the time of driving. The court, in both cases, justi-
fied this position by making reference to other states' drunk driv-
ing laws, specifically the New York drunk driving laws. Referring
to People v Mertz,98 the court determined that if any change is to
91. 386 Pa Super 515, 563 A2d 502 (1989).
92. Britcher, 563 A2d at 509.
93. 392 Pa Super 489, 573 A2d 569 (1990).
94. Zelinski, 573 A2d at 573.
95. Pa , 601 A2d 1233 (1992).
96. Modaffare, 601 A2d at 1234.
97. Id at 1235.




be made, it is to be made by the legislature. In Mertz, relation
back was not needed because the New York statute99 did not re-
quire the BAC to be determined at the time of driving, just within
a specified time after driving had ceased.' 00
The issue now seems to have been decided. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has required the relation back of blood alcohol
tests to the time of driving in accordance with section 3731(a)(4).
If there is any change to be made, it must come from the legisla-
ture. The problem is, Jarman and Modaffare pertain to cases
where the BAC is just slightly in excess of 0.10% and the time
between the blood test and driving is at least one hour. What
would happen if the BAC was slightly greater than those in
Jarman and Modaffare or the time was less than one hour between
driving and the blood test? The supreme court still has not pro-
vided the lower courts with a bright-line test of where to draw the
line.
The lower courts are aware of this problem and, as in cases prior
to Jarman, are using their own judgment. An example of this is
Commonwealth v Osborne.'0' Citing Jarman and Modaffare, the
superior court reversed a conviction where the defendant's BAC
was 0.1488% (in excess of Jarman and Modaffare), the time be-
tween the blood test and driving was fifty minutes (less than in
Jarman and Modaffare), and the Commonwealth could not relate
the BAC back to the time of driving.'02 The court determined
0.1488% blood alcohol "not to be a substantial departure from
0.10%" and fifty minutes was a "significant factor weakening the
inference of guilt."'' 3 The court reached this decision after yet an-
other discussion of how other states' statutes provide a more work-
able standard.
Jarman has provided the Pennsylvania courts with help in ap-
plying section 3731(a)(4) by further defining what the law requires.
However, it has by no means eliminated the court's struggle when
a defendant's BAC is not excessive or there is a lapse of time be-
tween the blood test and driving.
What stands out in Jarman, Modaffare and Osborne are the dis-
cussions by the courts of neighboring state statutes in contrast to
the language of section 3731(a)(4). Each case specifically states
99. NY Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) (McKinney 1986).
100. Mertz, 497 NE2d at 658.
101. Pa Super , 606 A2d 529 (1992).
102. Osborne, 606 A2d at 531.
103. Id.
4251993
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that the defendant would have been convicted under those statutes
and there would have been no issue for the courts to resolve. Since
1982, the courts have attempted to apply section 3731(a)(4) and
have done so in a sporadic manner. These recent decisions have
helped somewhat in interpretation, but more specifically, they
have pointed out that until the Pennsylvania legislature rewrites
the statute, the struggle in applying the Pennsylvania drunk driv-
ing laws will continue.
Tim Berggren
